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ABSTRACT 
This  paper  uses  the  Benninga-Helmantel-Sarig  (2005)  framework  to  value  equity  based 
compensation (employee stock options (ESOs) and restricted stocks units (RSU)) in a framework 
which  takes  explicit  account  of  employee  non-diversification  in  addition  to  the  standard 
features  of  vesting  and  forfeit  (or  forced  exercise)  of  the  stock  options.    This  framework 
provides  an  endogenous  explanation  of  early  exercise  of  employee  stock  options,  has  a 
computational advantage over existing utility maximizing models, and also allows us to quantify 
the non-diversification effects.  Using a proprietary dataset which contain 33,294 employee 
stock option exercise records at sixty five publically traded firms between 1993-2009 (both 
executive and non-executive employees), we measure the non-marketability associated with 
untradeable stock options, and use it to value ESOs.  We find that the private pricing model 
value at the grant date is about 50% less than the value of a plain vanilla Black-Scholes option 
value.  We also find that the private pricing model is aligned with empirical findings of ESOs.  
This pricing has implication for the FAS 123(R) for estimating the fair value of share based 
payment. 
 
JEL classification: G12, G13, G32. 
Keywords:  Employee stock options, restricted stocks, under pricing. 
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Non-Marketability and the Value of Equity 
Based Compensation 
1.  Introduction 
A large literature deals with the pricing and economic implications of employee stock 
options (which are basically financial derivatives in incomplete markets and should be priced as 
such (Grasselli, 2005)) and with the pricing of restricted stocks.  In this paper we extend this 
literature  to  consider  the  impact  of  non-marketability  on  these  share-based  payments.  
Employing a model first developed by Benninga, Helmantel, Sarig (BHS, 2005), we incorporate 
non-marketability into employee stock options (ESOs) and restricted stock units (RSU) pricing. 
Our model also allows us to consider differential access to capital markets of employees and 
the firm. 
Employee stock options have special characteristics:  It contains vesting period, in which 
upon job termination, the options are forfeited.  After the vesting period, upon job termination, 
the  employee  can  not  continue  to  hold  the  stock  option  (usually  90  days  after  the  job 
termination date).  In addition, ESOs are non-transferable, a characteristic which causes to early 
exercise of the stock options and also contribute to the fact that ESOs has no market price. 
Generally,  ESOs  valuation  models  can  be  divided  into  three  categories:    Utility 
maximizing models, lattice based models and continuous based models.  The utility maximizing 
models use a risk-averse utility function, and derive the employee's certainty equivalent to 
establish whether the employee exercises the stock option (before maturity).  The lattice based 
models are usually modifications of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (1997) binomial framework with 
an  exogenous  early  exercise  decision,  and  the  continuous  based  models  are  usually 
modification of the Black-Scholes-Merton model with exogenous early exercise decision as well.  
The use of the BHS (2005) model for ESOs valuation incorporates the non-marketability 
effect into ESO pricing.  The model introduce private state prices, which are appropriate state 
prices  for  risk-averse  employees  that  restricted  in  their  diversification  and  are  therefore 
exposed to some of the firm’s specific risk.   
The private pricing model has two computational advantages over existing approaches 
in  pricing  ESOs.    First,  compared  to  lattice  and  continuous-time  models,  it  provides  an 
endogenous explanation of ESO early exercise.  While the early exercise phenomenon of ESOs is 
widely  documented,  most  ESO  pricing  models,  such  as  the  Hull  and  White  (2004)  model, 
employ an arbitrary algorithm to explain early exercise.
1  Compared to the utility maximizing 
                                                      
1 Hull and White (2004) assume that the holder of an ESO will early-exercise if the stock price St is a multiple m of 
the option exercise price X.  A common value for m is 2, but this is somewhat arbitrary.  As we show in section 3, in 
our model early exercise is endogenous. 2 
models which provide endogenous early exercise decision, the private pricing model can be 
viewed as a model that incorporates the utility model parameters into a single factor and thus 
provides a simplified and more flexible approach to describe exercise behavior and to compute 
the ESO value.
2  Therefore, pricing ESO using the private pricing model combines the flexibility 
of  the  binomial  model  along  with  a  theoretical  framework  which  models  the  behavioral 
approach that characterizes utility maximizing models.  In this respect, we show that the use of 
the BHS model is aligned with empirical findings in studies on ESOs databases:  The ratio of the 
stock price to exercise price and the value forgone (in percentage) comparing to Black-Scholes 
value (both at the exercise date) are within empirical estimations range.  The employee tends 
to  exercise  earlier  as  more  restrictions  are  added  to  the  stock  options,  if  he  is  more 
undiversified and when the stock's volatility is higher.   
Additional advantage of the BHS model in pricing ESOs is that we are able to quantify 
the non-diversification effects.  We show that the cost of ESOs is less than that postulated by 
other numerical models.  To show this, we incorporate vesting, exit rate, dividend yield into our 
private pricing model and compare it to the FASB model, the Hull and White model (2004), 
Cvitanić, Wiener, and Zapatero (2007) model and Brisley and Anderson model (2008), and show 
that our model yields lower valuation results. 
We use the BHS model to value another share-based payment form - restricted stock 
units (RSU).  In this case, since the trading restriction is imposed only in the vesting period, the 
private state prices are used in this period along.  In accordance with Damodaran (2005a), we 
find that the value of RSUs depends on the length of the vesting period, the un-diversification 
measure of the employee and the stock volatility.  
In the second part of the paper, we use a proprietary data set that was obtained from 
Tamir  Fishman  &  Co.  for  the  estimation  of  the  non  marketability  measure.3    The 
comprehensive stock option database comprise of complete histories of stock option grants, 
vesting structures, option exercises and cancellation events for all employees in eighty seven 
firms.  The  stock  option  grants  sample  period  is  between  1993  and  2009,  and the  exercise 
records are between 1998 and 2009. Tamir Fishman supplied this data on the condition that the 
companies and their employees' identity remain anonymous.   
Our  unit  analysis  is  exercise  record,  and  we  employ  two  measures  of  the  non 
marketability estimation. The first measure uses the stock price to exercise price ratio at the 
exercise date. In this respect, we perform a general estimation, which uses "representative" 
characteristics for the stock option (i.e., the same standard deviation and risk free rate for all 
                                                      
2 The utility-maximizing approach requires explicit specification of variables such as the employee risk aversion, her 
outside wealth, the proportion of her outside wealth comparing to her option wealth, the type of investment of 
her outside wealth etc.  This, in addition to the computational difficulty, makes it reasonable to assume that utility 
based models would not be common in practice (as implied by Chance (2004)). 
3 Tamir Fishman & Co. is an Israeli based investment house which offers management services of share-based 
compensation programs. 3 
the  stock  options)  and  specific  estimation,  which  uses  the  specific  characteristics  for  each 
exercise record at the exercise date, in order to receive an accurate estimation as possible.  We 
use this non marketability estimation to value the stock option at the grant date using the 
specific characteristics of the stock option at the grant date, and find that the value of the stock 
option is about 50% less than a plain vanilla stock option value, calculated by the BS option 
pricing model.  The second estimation of the non marketability measure uses the substitution 
ratio between ESOs and RSUs.  After the introduction of accounting standard FAS 123(R), firms 
began  to  grant  RSU  to  employees  as  a  substitute  for  stock  option  grants.
4    We  use  this 
substitution ratio to estimate non marketability, with account to the fact that RSUs are also 
face non-marketability at the vesting period. 
The implications of the use private pricing model in share-based payments valuation are 
significant, both economically and for measuring the fair value of share-based payments under 
the accounting standards, such as FAS 123(R) and IFRS2.  Both statements declare that their 
objective is to measure the share based payment based on the value of employee services 
received in exchange of the equity instruments.
5  Both statements acknowledge that this value 
can not be measured directly and thus set guidelines for a fair value measure.  However, the 
statements are unclear on how this fair value is to be measured, despite the fact that this 
measurement-basis question of has been dealt with in the literature (both theoretically and 
computationally).  In this respect, we highlight the following question: Is there a difference 
between the value of the stock option to the employee and the cost to the granting firm, and in 
case there is a difference, what should be expensed?  Carpenter (1998) and Hall and Murphy 
(2002) claim that the cost to the firm is higher than the value to the employee, and that for 
financial accounting purposes what should matter is the company’s cost of granting an option 
(which is reasonably approximated by Black–Scholes) and not the value of the option to the 
executive recipient.
6  The other notion, in which we support, claims that value equals cost, 
since as oppose to cash compensation, granting stock options to executives provides them with 
incentives.  These incentives add value to the firm (comparing to cash compensation), thus 
lowering the cost of the stock option granted.  This discounted cost, which conceptually parallel 
to the record of goodwill in the financial reports, should be expensed.
7    
  The  structure  of  this  paper  is  as  follows:  Section  2  presents  the  implications  of 
Benninga-Helmantel-Sarig  (2005)  model  and  study  its  implications  on  stock  option  pricing.  
                                                      
4 For example, on December 2005 Intel announced that starting from 2006, it will replace stock option grants with 
restricted stocks grants in a ratio of about one third (see below). 
5 See, for example, paragraph 9 in FAS 123(R). 
6 The notion that cost is bigger than value is also supported by Kadam et al. (2005), Ignersoll (2006), Cvitanić et al. 
(2007), Cai and Vijh (2004) and Carpenter (2008). 
7 Chance (2004), Chance and Yang (2004), Lambert and Larcker (2004), Rubinstein (1995) and Zion and Carcache 
(2004) from Credit Suisse First Boston bank also support this view.  Ehrhardt (2004) also notes that the incentive 
characteristic of executive stock options has a “goodwill” nature (Chance (2004)). 4 
Section 3 implement the model and compares its implications to empirical findings.  Section 4 
compares various valuation models.  Section 5 uses the Benninga-Helmantel-Sarig (2005) model 
to price restricted stocks.  Section 6 uses empirical data to measure the non marketability of 
the pricing model.  Section 7 discusses the accounting treatment of equity based compensation 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  Imperfect markets, non-diversification, and the valuation of ESOs 
The model   
We use a model developed by Benninga, Helmantel, and Sarig (BHS, 2005) to represent 
the impact of non-diversification on pricing.  The BHS model represents pricing in a binomial 
framework and assumes that the non-diversified consumer has too much consumption in the 
good states and too little consumption in the bad states of the world.  The resulting state prices 
of a non-diversified consumer will be lower than the market state prices in good states and 
higher than the market prices in bad states.
8 
  Let { } , u d q q  represent the public price of $1 in an up/down state world, and let { } , u d p p  
represent the private price of $1 in an up/down state world, respectively.  We assume that 
firms use the public state prices for valuation, whereas employees use the private state prices. 
We assume that: 
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where  
r – The one period interest rate;  1 R r = +  
u – The one period move-up factor (in percentage);  1 U u = +  
d – The one period move-down factor (in percentage);  1 D d = +  
δ – The spread between the public and the private state prices (this is the diversification 
measure) 
The use of the same state prices by both the firm and employees assumes that the 
employees  can  trade  freely  in  all the  assets  in  the  market  (i.e.,  can  create  long  and  short 
positions).    Differentiating  between  public  and  private  state  prices  allows  us  to  drop  this 
assumption.  Essentially, we assume that—as a result of trading and hedging restrictions on 
option grants—risk-averse employees are restricted in their diversification and are therefore 
                                                      
8 State prices are the marginal rates of substitution adjusted for the employee’s state probabilities and pure rate of 
time preference. 5 
exposed to some of the firm’s specific risk.  The limitations on the stock option granted to the 
employee and on the employee hedging activity are designated to tie the employee to firm 
performance.
9  The technical meaning of above assumptions is that both private and public 
state prices assume equal access to the borrowing/lending market and hence face the same 
borrowing rate.  However, the private price for the up state pu is lower than the public price for 
the same state qu and the private price for the down state pd is higher than the public price for 
the same state qd. 
  If  state  prices  are  computed  using  the  probability-adjusted  marginal  rates  of 
substitution,  then  the  condition  , p q p q u u d d < >   can  be  interpreted  as  meaning  that the 
employee would like to transfer consumption from the good state to the bad state:  Relative to 
his optimal consumption pattern, an employee has too much consumption in the good state 
and too little consumption in the bad state.  δ is the spread between the public and private 
state prices that captures the diversification measure of the employee (or more precisely, the 
non-diversification measure).  In other words, δ represents the higher tolerance to the firm’s 
risk of the well-diversified investor than that of the incompletely diversified employee (BHS 
2005).
10   
  Since pu < qu and since an employee stock option pays off in the up states, it is obvious 
that the private valuation of an ESO is less than the public valuation.  The lemma below shows 
that this will also be true for restricted stock: 
 
Lemma 1:  If 
1 1
p p q q d u u d R R
− = < = − , the employee’s valuation of the firm using his private 
state prices is less than the same valuation using the public state prices.  That is:  
Private Public C p U p D q U q D C u d u d ≡ ⋅ + ⋅ < ⋅ + ⋅ ≡  
Where  Private C  and  Public C  denote the private and public value of the firm, respectively.   
Proof:    We  assume  that  u u p q <   and  d d p q > .    Hence,  0 u u q p − >   and  0 d d p q − > .    Since 
u d > , we have ( ) ( ) q p U p q D u u d d − ⋅ > − ⋅ , which can be rewritten to the result desired.  || 
 
The effect of non-marketability on stock options (with a marketable underlying asset) 
can be significant.  For example, Brenner et al.(2001) studied nontraded currency options and 
                                                      
9 This is the most common justification given by firms for employee stock options (Damodaran 2005). 
10 Bick (1987) shows that geometric Brownian motion for a stock price is compatible with a utility function if and 
only if the utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion and the consumption process is multiplicative.  It 
follows that only in the cases described by Bick is the Black-Scholes pricing for European options underpinned by 
utility foundations.  Note that any binomial model and any utility function necessarily give rise to a set of state 
prices and a (binomial) pricing function for options.  However, only in the case that the Bick assumptions hold (they 
evidently do not in the BHS model) do we get Black-Scholes. 6 
concluded that they traded at a discount of approximately 21%, relative to otherwise similar 
liquid  options.    Eldor  et  al.(2006)  investigate  nontradable  and  tradable  indentical  Treasury 
derivatives.  They find that nontradability is significant and covaries positively with interest rate 
volatility.  This issue is of particular relevance in the valuation of employee stock options that 
are offered as compensation at publicly traded companies (Damodaran 2005b).  
 
ESOs valuation using BHS 2005 model 
  We use the BHS 2005 model to value ESOs, considering the following parameters: 
Vesting period:  We incorporate vesting period in the model. First of all, in this period 
the stock option can not be exercised.  In addition, we employ an exit rate in this period, and at 
each period the option value decreases at the appropriate rate of the period.  It reflects the fact 
that the stock options are forfeited upon job termination. 
Forced exercise:  We continue to incorporate the exit rate after the vesting as well.
11  
However, upon job termination in this case, the employee will receive the Max(St – X,0).  It 
reflects the fact that the forced exercise upon job termination after vesting (usually during 90 
days).  
Non-Marketability:    By  non-marketability  we  refer  to  the  fact  that  employee  stock 
options  are  non-tradable  and  non-hedge-able,  and  therefore  cause  to  deviations  from 
diversification to the employee.  We use the private pricing model to incorporate this fact in the 
ESO valuation.  The private pricing is being used before and after vesting, reflecting the fact that 
the employee can not trade or hedge the stock option during his entire holding period. 
In this respect, Chance and Yang (2004) mention it is not at all clear that risk neutral 
valuation, incorporated in the public state prices  { } , u d q q  is appropriate for accommodating 
risks  such  as  forfeiture  and  early  exercise.  These  risks  are  not  irrelevant,  probably  not 
diversifiable, and almost surely do not have a zero market price of risk. 
Life Term:  We use the contractual life term and not expected term.  The reason is that 
the  expected  term  is  a  result  of  non-marketability  and  not  the  cause.    Modeling  non-
marketability  using  the  private  state  prices  allows  us  to  receive  an  expected  term 
endogenously.   
 
Valuation effects of public versus private state pricing 
Figure 1 shows the valuation of an European plain-vanilla call option using the Black-
Scholes model, public state prices and private state prices (both in a binomial framework).  The 
graphs assume that both the private and public prices face the same interest rate, so that 
U D U D q q p p + = + . 
                                                      
11 We choose to use the same exit rate before and after vesting.  Changing this assumption will adjust the stock 
option value accordingly.   7 
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Figure 1: Comparing the price of a European plain vanilla call option using the Black-Scholes pricing model, the 
standard binomial model and the private pricing model with δ = 0.01, according to the following assumptions: 
Exercise price = 50 ; Time to expiration = 10 years ; Annual interest rate = 5% ; Volatility = 35% ; Number of 
subdivisions of one year (for the binomial framework) = 30. 
 
Figure  2  presents  the  estimation  of  European plain  vanilla  call  options  for  different 
values of δ.   8 
Impact of δ on Plain-Vanilla Call Price 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
O
p
t
i
o
n
 
v
a
l
u
e
Stock price
Intrinsic Binomial Delta =  0.01 Delta = 0.02 Delta = 0.04  
Figure  2:  Comparing  the  price  of  a  European  plain  vanilla  call  option  for  different  values  of  δ.    The  input 
assumptions are: exercise price = 50; time to expiration = 10 years; annual interest rate = 5%; volatility = 35%; 
number of subdivisions of one year (for the binomial framework) = 30. 
 
  From figures 1 and 2, it is clear that the private pricing model leads to possible early-
exercise  of  American  plain-vanilla  calls  on  non-dividend-paying  stocks.    This  outcome  is  as 
opposed to the classical option pricing theory, and it is due to the under-diversification of the 
option holder.  It is thus also clear that this model leads to endogenous early exercise for 
employee stock options.  Figure 3 presents the pricing of ESO with different characteristics 
along with the private pricing model.  9 
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Figure 3:  ESOs values with different characteristics: Plain vanilla stock option; stock option with vesting period; 
stock option with vesting period and dividend payments; stock option with vesting period, exit rate and dividend 
payments. 
Figure 3 verifies that as more limitation are added to the stock options, the employee 
will tend to exercise it earlier (putting differently, the employee will attribute a lower value to 
the stock option as more limitations are added).   
 
ESO valuation with differential access to capital markets 
  The previous section dealt with the case where employees are under-diversified, but 
have equal access to borrowing and lending markets.  In this section we assume an additional 
market  imperfection  in  which  the  employee  and  the  firm  have  an  unequal  access  to  the 
borrowing/lending market.  In practice, small investors (non-executive employees in this case) 
usually face a higher borrowing/lending interest rate than investors/firms with large amounts 
of collaterals (Berk and DeMarzo (2007)).  We hypothesize that this market imperfection will 
drive a higher valuation wedge between the valuation of ESOs (as seen by the firm and as seen 
by the employee) than in the case discussed in the previous section, of different state prices but 
with equal access to the borrowing/lending market. 10 
  Let  { } , u d q q   represent  the  public  price  of  $1  in  an  up/down  state  world,  and  let 
{ }
* * , u d p p represent the private price of $1 in an up/down state world, respectively.  We assume 
that: 
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where  u δ is the difference between the private and the public price in up state,  d δ  is the 
difference between the private and the public price in the down state, R
*  is employee's gross 
borrowing/lending rate and the R is the firm's gross borrowing/lending rate.  The technical 
meaning of the assumptions is that the difference between the private and the public price for 
the up state ( u δ ) is higher than the difference between the private and the public price for the 
down state ( d δ ), as presented in the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 2:  If 
* *
* 1 1
u d u d q q p p R R
= + > + = , the difference between the private and the public 
price for the up state is higher than the difference between the private and the public price for 
the down state. That is:  u d δ δ > . 
Proof:    We assume that 
* R R > , or   *
1 1
0
R R
− > .  Thus,  ( )
* * 0 u d u d u d q q p p δ δ + − + = − > .  || 
 
We also hypothesize that the differential access to capital markets of employees and 
the firm drives a higher valuation wedge between the valuation of ESOs (as seen by the firm 
and as seen by the employee) than in the case discussed in the previous section, of different 
state prices but with equal access to the borrowing/lending market.  We test this hypothesis 
using the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 3: Assuming R > 0 and 
* *
* 1 1
u d u d p p p p R R
= + > + = , then  . u d δ δ δ > >  
Proof:    From 
* *
* 1 1 0 u d u d p p p p R R
= + > + = >  it follows that either
* * 0 u u d d p p p p − > − >  or 
* * 0 u u d d p p p p − > − < .    For  the  first  part  of  both  expressions  it  follows  that 
* 0 u u u p p δ δ − > ⇒ >  and 
* 0 d d d p p δ δ − > ⇒ > , and thus from transitivity  . u d δ δ δ > >   For 11 
the second expression it follows that 
* 0 u u u p p δ δ − < ⇒ <  and 
* 0 d d d p p δ δ − < ⇒ < , and thus 
. u d δ δ δ < <  Using Lemma 2 ( u d δ δ > )  we disqualify the latter option, and thus  . u d δ δ δ > > || 
 
Incorporating  Lemmas 2  and 3  results  in  a  lower  value  of  stocks  and  stock  options 
comparing to an economy with equal access to capital markets.   
 
3.  Private pricing model:  Numerical implications  
In this section we compare the results of the private pricing model to the empirical 
findings presented in the literature.  These comparisons are intended to verify that the private 
pricing model is aligned with empirical findings, indicating that the model is suitable to value 
ESOs.   
 
Calculating the stock price to exercise price ratio at the exercise date 
Our model allows us to calculate the implied ratio of the stock price to exercise price at 
the exercise date (this ratio is known as the Hull and White (2004) multiple M).  Assuming that 
the employee exercises the stock option when the private value is equals to the intrinsic value 
(after the vesting period), we use the firm’s stock price at this date and derive the stock price to 
the exercise price ratio.  The following figure presents the change in the stock price to exercise 
price  ratio  as  a  function  of  the  non  marketability  measure  δ  for  different  stock  option 
characteristics.  
 12 
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Figure 4: The implied stock price to exercise price ratio for different values of δ.   
 
Table  1  reports the  empirical  findings  regarding  the  stock  to  exercise  price  ratio.  It 
suggests that the implied ratio calculated using the private pricing model is within the empirical 
findings  range.   Those  findings  join  to  the  ones  of  Carpenter  et  al.  (2008),  which  provides 
extensive documentation regarding the stock/exercise price across industries.  Over all, the 
data indicates a large variation in the ratios both across and within sectors, with very high ratios 
reflecting the run-up in the stock market during our sample period.
12 
                                                      
12 Possible explanations are the variation in the sample period and in the sample population. 13 
 
Table 1: Empirical data on the stock price to exercise price ratio
13  
  Huddart and Lang (1996): 
Average  Median  Quartile  Quartile  Sample  Sample period 
2.2  1.6  1.283  2.5  All employees   Late 80s – early 90s 
  Carpenter (1998): 
Average  Median  Quartile  Quartile  S.D.     Sample  Sample period 
2.75  2.47  1.15  8.32  1.42    Executives   1979 - 1994 
  Bettis, Bizjak, Lemmon (2005) 
Average  Median  1st percentile  99th percentile  Sample  Sample period 
3.55  2.57  1.04  17.34  Corporate insiders    1996 - 2002 
Even after considering the variation in the stock to exercise ratio, we can see that the 
private pricing model is within the range of all the studies that use empirical data.  From the 
private state pricing perspective, it can be explained as higher delta for lower-level employees: 
a higher delta means that the employee places higher value for the up state, and therefore will 
exercise earlier and will have a lower ratio of the stock to exercise price.  
 
Calculating the private value to BS value ratio at the exercise date 
Another comparison, which we employ in this subsection, is comparing the remaining 
Black-Scholes value relative to the intrinsic value (or private value) at the exercise date.  We 
show that this ratio, calculated using the private pricing, is within the empirical findings range 
as well.  
Figure 5 presents the forgone value under early exercise of the ESO (in percentage).  
This value is calculated in Black-Scholes terms, and is calculated as 
Intrinsic value
1
BS value
− . Since this 
ratio is calculated at the (early) exercise date, we use a shorter contractual option life and with 
no vesting period. 
 
                                                      
13 Hemmer, Matsunaga and Shevlin (1996) report similar findings regarding this ratio. 14 
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Figure 5:  The Black-Scholes forgone value under early exercise of ESO (in Percentage) under the assumption that 
the employee exercises the stock option when his private value equals the intrinsic value.  The input assumptions 
are:  exercise price = 50; time to expiration = 7 years; annual interest rate = 5%; volatility = 35%; number of 
subdivisions of one year (for the binomial framework) = 50; vesting period = 2; annual dividend yield = 0%; annual 
exit rate = 0%. 
Our computations show that the value the employee waives changes dramatically in 
relation to his non-diversification measure.  For a waiver of 10-20% of Black-Scholes value, the 
non-diversification measure δ is between 0.025-0.03. 
As for the empirical findings, table 2 reports the empirical findings regarding the ESO 
intrinsic value to the remaining Black-Scholes option value at the (early) exercise date.
14  The 
sample data indicates on a large variation in this ratio as well.  However, while Bettis, Bizjak and 
Lemmon (2005) measure that this ratio at the exercise date, Huddart and Lang (2003) measure 
it for an average month, and not just in the exercise date.
15  Thus, Bettis et al. (2005) data is 
more relevant to our examination below.   
 
                                                      
14 We assume that the employee exercises the stock option once the intrinsic value equals to his private value.  
Thus, the option's intrinsic value equals the private value at the exercise date.  
15 In addition, Huddart and Lang (2003) used the Barone-Adesi and Whaley model (and not the Black-Scholes 
model) to estimate the ESO value at time t.  15 
Table  2:  Empirical  data  on  the  ratio  of  intrinsic  value  to  the 
remaining American option value 
Huddart and Lang (2003)
16: 
Average  Median  Quartile  Quartile  S.D.  Sample  Sample period 
0.7423  0.7915  0.5544  0.965  0.2308 All employees  1985 - 1994 
Bettis, Bizjak, Lemmon (2005) 
Average  Median  1st percentile  99th percentile  Sample  Sample period 
0.9  0.84  0.12  1  Corporate insiders  1996 - 2002 
Another interesting examination in this respect is the one made by Zions Bancorp.  Zions 
Bancorp issue securities that replicate the cash flow generated from ESOs and sell it in an 
auction.  The auction results point out that the replicating security yield lower values than the 
Black-Scholes values using the same assumptions at the issuance date.  For example, the price 
of the replication instrument in the auction that was held on 5/4-7/2007 was set on $12.06, 
which  is  14%  lower than  the  Black-Scholes  value.
17    However,  the  Black-Scholes  value  was 
calculated using expected life, and not using the time to maturity of the stock option, so the 
value (in percentage of Black-Scholes value) should be lower.  
 
4.  Comparison of valuation models 
Categories of ESOs valuation models 
Generally,  we  can  divide  the  ESOs  valuation  models  to  three  categories:  Utility-
maximizing models, lattice models and continuous models.  Utility-maximizing models assume 
that early exercise occurs according to a policy that maximizes the employee’s expected utility 
subject to hedging restrictions.  Examples include Marcus and Kulatilaka (1994), Huddart (1994) 
and Rubinstein (1995).  Lattice models are some kind of a “code name” used in financial reports 
to the binomial option pricing model and Monte Carlo simulations.  Examples for lattice models 
include  Hull and  White  (2004), Ammann  and Seiz  (2004)  and  Brisley and Anderson  (2008).  
Continuous models are usually variants of the Black-Scholes-Merton model that incorporate 
ESOs  restrictions.    Appendix  A  provides  a  survey  of  the  ESO  pricing  models  from  all  three 
categories.  
 
                                                      
16 Huddart and Lang (1996) also report this ratio for the same sample, but the data is presented for each firm 
separately. 
17 See https://www.auctions.zionsdirect.com/auction/337/prospectus, page 52. 16 
Comparisons of ESOs valuation models 
We compare between several valuations models of ESOs: the Hull and White (2004), 
Brisley and Anderson (2008), FASB model, and Cvitanić, Wiener, and Zapatero (2007).  We show 
that the value of the stock option decreases after employing the non-marketability effect. 
We begin with a short presentation of the valuation models' principals: 
•  Hull  and  White  (2004):    Incorporate  dividend  yield,  vesting  period,  exit  rate  and 
exogenous early exercise decision which is based on the stock price to exercise price ratio.  
Denoting M as the stock to exercise price ratio, the employee exercises the stock option at time 
t when max[St – X,0] > (M-1)*X.  HW model is one of the most popular models of ESOs valuation 
for expensing purposes under FASB 123R (Brisley and Anderson (2008)).
  
• Brisley and Anderson (2008):  Incorporate dividend yield, vesting period, exit rate and 
exogenous early exercise decision which is based on a fixed proportion of μ from the Black-
Scholes value at the exercise date. Thus, the employee exercises the stock option at time t if 
max[St – X,0]>μ*BScall(t). 
• FASB model:  Incorporate dividend yield, vesting period and exit rate. Accounts for 
early exercise by setting the maturity of the stock option equal to the option's expected life.  In 
addition, the adjustment of the stock option to the vesting period and the exit rate is different 
from other comparable valuation models.  
• Cvitanić, Wiener, and Zapatero (2007):  Incorporate dividend yield, vesting period and 
exit rate.   The early exercise barrier here is similar to Hull and White's (2004) multiple M (using 
the stock price), but the barrier here is decreasing (at a rate of α) as the option approaches 
expiration.  
  In the comparison below, we use a Hull and White multiple M of 2.2, a Brisley and 
Anderson Multiple μ of 6, a FASB expect life of 6 years and a Cvitanić, Wiener and Zapatero 
barrier  of  110  (which  is  parallel  to  a  2.2  Hull  and  White  multiple).    Figure  6  presents  the 
comparison results: 17 
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Figure 6:  Comparison between following ESOs valuation models: Hull and White (2004); Brisley and Anderson 
(2008); FASB proposal; the Cvitanić, Wiener, Zapatero (2007) and the private pricing valuation.  
The input assumptions are: exercise price = 50 ; time to expiration = 10 years ; annual interest rate = 5% ; volatility 
= 35%; number of subdivisions of one year (for the binomial framework) = 30; δ = 0.01; vesting period = 3; annual 
dividend yield = 0% ; annual exit rate = 3%; expected life term = 6; Hull-White multiple = 2.2; Brisley-Anderson 
multiple = 0.7; Cvitanić, Wiener, Zapatero barrier = 110 (parallel to Hull-White multiple of 2.2). 
 
Our computations show that most existing models of ESO valuation, which are based on 
permutations of the Black-Scholes pricing formula at market prices, over-cost the ESO. 
 
5. Private pricing model: valuation of restricted stocks 
Restricted  stocks  are  awards  of  the  company  stocks  to  employees,  in  which  the 
employee’s  rights  in  the  stock  are  restricted  until  the  shares  vest.    Once  the  vesting 
requirements are met, the employee owns unrestricted shares.  There are two popular forms of 
restricted  stocks:  restricted  stocks  (RS)  and  restricted  stock  units  (RSU),  which  are  more 
common.  The key difference is that RSU programs deliver the stocks to the employee only after 
the vesting period while RS programs deliver the (restricted) stocks at the grant date.  Thus, 
RSU holders have no voting rights and usually are not entitled to receive dividend or dividend 
equivalents.  We use the private pricing model to value RSU. 18 
 
Valuation of restricted stock  
Damodaran (2005a) specify characteristics of restricted stock that can affect value.  The 
first is the mandatory employment during the vesting period. The second is the illiquidity of the 
restricted  stock:  The  illiquidity  premium  depends  upon  the  period  of  illiquidity,  hedging  / 
borrowing constraints and stock volatility (which increases the cost of illiquidity).  The third is a 
performance condition that should be met (in terms of revenues or earnings, for example).  In 
this paper we use the private pricing model to incorporate the first and second characteristics 
in the restricted stock valuation. 
Longstaff (1995) derives an upper bound for the value of marketability using option 
pricing theory by considering an investor with perfect market timing abilities who owns an 
untradable asset for a period.  He concludes that marketability discount can be significant also 
when  the  period  of  non-marketability  is  relatively  short,  and  estimates  the  marketability 
discount as a function of the restriction period and the volatility of the asset's return.  Chen and 
Xiong (2001) find that the discounts in restricted stocks vary across firms with smaller discounts 
at larger, less volatile firms (in the Chineese market). 
The empirical evidence on non-marketability discount stems from two types of studies 
(Damodaran 2005b).  The first type examines restricted stocks issued by publicly traded firms.  
The issuance price of the restricted stock is usually lower than the market price of the stock, 
and the difference is attributed to the illiquidity of the restricted stock.
18  The second type 
compares the IPO stock prices of firms to the price of the same shares prior to the IPO.
19 
Under the first estimation type (which is more relevant to our case), Maher (1976) finds 
an average discount of 35.43% comparing to publicly traded stocks in analyzing purchases made 
by 4 mutual funds during 1969-1973,  Silber (1991) find a median discount of 33.75% during the 
period 1981-1988 and Johnson (1999) finds a smaller discount of 20%.
20  However, one of the 
criticisms on these findings is that the investors in those private placements may also provide 
other  services  to  the  firm,  and  the  discount  reflects  it  (Damodaran  2005b).    This  service 
difference is isolated by comparing the unregistered private placements to registered private 
placements of equity by the same companies, and thus provides a better measure of the non-
marketability discount.  Wruck (1989) estimated an average (median) discount of 17.6% (10.4%) 
and Hertzel and Smith (1993) find a median difference of 13.2% between the two placement 
types (and a median discount of 13.26% across all private placements). Bajaj et al. (2001) report 
attribute 14% for marketability discount after controlling for differences across firms.  
                                                      
18 In this respect, restricted stocks are not registered with the SEC, and sold through private placements under SEC 
rule 144.  The stocks can not be resold in the open market for a one (two) year period from (before) 1997, and 
limited amounts can be sold afterwards.  
19 Bajaj et al (2001) provides an elaborated literature survey of the illiquidity discount estimations. 
20 For additional studies, see also the Institutional Investor Study Report of the SEC (1971), Gelman (1972) and 
Trout (1977). 19 
 
Valuing restricted stocks using the private pricing model 
We use the private pricing model to estimate RSUs.  Since RSUs are not tradable before 
vesting, we use private state prices with exogenous exit rate during the vesting period, (in 
which the stocks are non-tradable and the employee is subject to forfeit of the stocks upon job 
termination).  After the vesting period, when the stock is tradable and unrestricted, we use 
public state prices without any other restrictions.   
Our  pricing  methodology  considers  explicitly  the  non-marketability  of  the  restricted 
stock in the vesting period.  This feature, along with the possibility of job termination, lowers 
the restricted stock value.  Note that if the employee would be compensated in a tradable 
stock, our pricing would have been equal to the stock price.  Figure 7 presents the value of RSU 
as a function of the non diversification measure δ. 
A restricted stock value relative to δ 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
Delta
R
s
t
o
c
k
 
Figure 7: The value of RSU relative to un-diversification measure δ.  The input assumptions are: stock price = 50; 
vesting period = 3 years; annual risk free rate = 5%; volatility = 35%; annual dividend yield = 0%; exit rate = 3%; δ = 
0.01; number of periods = 400 (with a number of 40 subdivisions in a year). 
  The value of the restricted stock (at the grant date) is lower as the un-diversification 
measure δ is higher during the vesting period.  
 20 
6. Estimation of the non-diversification measure  
We  use  proprietary  data  set  of  ESOs  grants  and  exercise  records  and  reverse-
engineering techniques we are able to estimate the non diversification measure by applying 
two estimations: 
 The first estimation of the non diversification measure uses the actual stock price to 
exercise ratio at the employee exercise date. In this respect, we perform a general estimation 
and a specific estimation.  The general estimation uses the same characteristics for the stock 
option  (i.e.  the  same  standard  deviation  and  risk  free  rate  for  all the stock  options).    The 
specific estimation uses calculation of all the stock option parameters at the exercise date, in 
order  to  receive  an  accurate  estimation  as  possible.    The  second  estimation  of  the  non 
diversification  measure  uses  a  substitution  ratio  between  ESOs  and  RSUs.    After  the 
introduction of FAS 123(R), firms began to grant RSU to employees as a substitute for stock 
option grants. We use this substitution ratio to estimate non diversification.   
 
Data Description 
We use a proprietary data set that was obtained from Tamir Fishman & Co., an Israeli 
based  investment  house  which  offers  management  services  of  share-based  compensation 
programs.  Tamir Fishman supplied this data on the condition that the companies and their 
employees' identity remain anonymous.  In this respect, we identify the companies by a two-
digit code.   
The  stock  option  database  comprises  of  complete  histories  of  stock  option  grants, 
vesting structures, option exercises and cancellation events for all employees in both private 
and public firms.  We identify ninety two firms that either are currently public, were public in 
the past or were acquired by a public firm and now serve as its subsidiary and granted SOPs.  
After processing the data (specified below), we are left with eighty seven firms. The stock 
option grants sample period is between 1993 and 2009, and the exercise records are between 
1998 and 2009.
21  
We perform the following actions:  First, we exclude exercise records which represent 
forced exercise (which can result from job termination or from mergers and acquisitions). In 
this respect, we adopt a conservative approach, and excluded all exercise records that were 
made 100 days before or after the employee job termination.  We use this measure since the 
common practice is to allow employees up to 3 months days to exercise their stock options 
after they cease working in the company, and add 10 more days as a measure of caution with 
respect to the end-date data.  We exclude 100 days before preceding the job termination to 
account for the case that the employee exercises his stock option as part of his plan to cease 
working in the firm.  As a result of the way the database is managed, this procedure also 
                                                      
21 We limit the exercise record period to 1998-2009 in order to avoid misspecification in the data prior to 1998. 21 
eliminated some ESO exercises in cases of mergers and acquisitions or in cases most of the 
exercise records were concentrated in a specific day, and results in reducing six firms from the 
sample.
22 In addition, we excluded exercise records in case the exercise date occurred when the 
company shares have not been traded and in cases the employee definition was Sub-contractor 
or Ex Sub-contractor.
23 
We also excluded stock options with exercise price lower than 0.01 (i.e., parallel to less 
than one cent) and all exercise records in which less than 50 stocks were exercised.
24  ESOs with 
low exercise price were excluded since such stock options are parallel to untradeable restricted 
stock units and small stock option exercises were excluded to avoid inference using negligible 
cash flows amounts. 
Next, we matched between the share price currency and the exercise price currency.  
This adjustment was necessary in companies in which the exercise price and the share prices 
were stated in different currencies.  We used the 12 noon buying rates reported on the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York website to adjust and match the currencies, except for New Israeli 
Shekel (NIS)―US dollars exchange rates which were taken from the Bank of Israel website.  
During  this  adjustment  another  three  firms  were  dropped.
25    We  also  traced  firms  in  the 
dataset that were acquired during the sample period, checked manually the exercise activity 
around the acquisition date and erase the exercise records from the dataset in case they exist.  
Our unit of analysis is based on employee-by-employee exercise records for eighty two 
companies that issued stock options to 64,754 employees over the sample period.  The basis 
sample for this stage contains 46,929 exercise records. Only 906 exercise records are not same-
day-sale exercise, representing 1.93% of the sample.   
 
Sample description 
Table 3 provides a description of the companies industries according to the two-digit 
firm-level  SIC  codes  as  appears  in  CRSP.  As  shown  in  table  3,  there  is  a  considerable 
heterogeneity in the firm industries type in the sample.  In addition, a major part of the firms 
comprising the dataset are "new-economy" firms related to computers, software, the internet, 
                                                      
22 There are cases in which the companies did not forced early exercise upon job termination, and the employee 
could exercise his stock option until the end of the option contractual life.  We didn't exclude these cases from our 
sample.  
23  According to Tamir  Fishman, in most of the cases this definition refers to outside supplier rather than an 
employee of the firm. 
24 The values that were excluded are 0, 0.0001, 0.001, 0.0025, 0.0027, 0.004, 0.0075, 0.0078 and 0.0094. 
25 As in the entire sample, these adjusted exercise prices should be higher than 0.01, otherwise, we excluded it 
from the sample as well. 22 
telecommunications or networking.
26  It represents 76.14% from the firms and 81.8% from the 
exercise records in the sample. 
Industry Two-digit 
firm-level SIC
Percentage 
(number of 
firms)
Percentage 
(number of 
employees)
Food And Kindred Products 20 1.14% 0.16%
Paper And Allied Products 26 1.14% 0.65%
Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 27 1.14% 0.13%
Chemicals And Allied Products 28 5.68% 0.87%
Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 35 15.91% 25.83%
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except 
Computer Equipment
36 26.14% 37.35%
Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical 
And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks
38 7.95% 8.75%
Communications 48 9.09% 7.00%
Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 50 1.14% 1.24%
Depository Institutions 60 1.14% 1.57%
Business Services 73 23.86% 10.38%
Amusement And Recreation Services 79 2.27% 0.04%
Health Services 80 1.14% 0.06%
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related Services 87 2.27% 5.96%
Table 3: Sample Firms Description
This table provides summary regarding the relevant Industries of the sample firms from Tamir Fishman database. This summary statistics is 
organized by the two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.  
 
Estimating non diversification using the stock price to exercise ratio at the exercise 
date 
In this subsection we value the non diversification using a given stock price to exercise 
price  ratio.    We  perform  two  estimations:  A  general  one  and  a  specific  one.    The  general 
estimation calculates the un-diversification measure δ of the employee relative to the stock 
price  to  exercise  price  ratio  for  a  given  stock  option  parameters  (such  as  exercise  price, 
volatility, interest rate etc.).  In the specific estimation we calculate the specific stock option 
parameters for each employee at the exercise date (i.e., for example, the historical volatility 
and risk-free interest rate of the employee at the exercise date), in order to receive an accurate 
estimation as possible. 
Table 4 reports the summary statistics of the stock price to the exercise price ratio in the 
sample data.  There is very important difference in the ratios both across and within sectors.  
The highest ratios reflect run-ups in the stock market during our sample period.  Specifically, 
these ratios stem from market run-ups during the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000.  
In general, the option exercise patterns present evidence on the persistence of early exercise 
behavior along with considerable heterogeneity both within and across sectors. 
                                                      
26 New economy firms defined as companies with primary SIC codes 3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 
4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371, 7372 and 7373 (See Hall and Murphy 2003). 23 
 
Industry Mean SD Max Min
Full Sample 3.211 4.371 66.536 0.933
Food And Kindred Products 2.684 1.675 11.417 1.300
Paper And Allied Products 2.545 0.906 5.590 1.121
Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 3.006 0.818 6.508 1.654
Chemicals And Allied Products 5.346 5.576 21.540 1.012
Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 3.519 4.293 63.500 0.982
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except 
Computer Equipment
3.059 4.458 60.268 0.971
Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical 
And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks
2.864 5.063 66.536 1.000
Communications 3.662 4.553 32.704 0.933
Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 3.756 2.033 35.104 1.017
Depository Institutions 1.560 0.188 1.878 0.997
Business Services 3.415 3.948 32.963 0.974
Amusement And Recreation Services 1.800 0.340 2.419 1.122
Health Services 1.426 0.335 2.246 1.017
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related Services 2.235 0.968 8.281 1.009
Table 4: Stock price to exercise price ratio at the exercise date
 
 
Table 5 uses the average stock price to exercise price ratio and calculates the implied 
delta for a given option parameters (the general estimation). The ratios are divided to groups 
according to the CRSP SIC codes, and in addition an average data is calculated to rank and file 
employees relative to executives and to exercise records that only exercised the stock option 
relative to exercise records in which the stock acquired was sold immediately.  
 
Industry Mean Delta
Full Sample 3.2114 0.0064
Food And Kindred Products 2.6836 0.0086
Paper And Allied Products 2.545 0.0094
Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 3.006 0.0071
Chemicals And Allied Products 5.3462 0.0032
Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 3.519 0.0056
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except Computer Equipment 3.0594 0.0069
Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks 2.8637 0.0077
Communications 3.6624 0.0053
Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 3.7562 0.0051
Depository Institutions 1.5598 0.0257
Business Services 3.415 0.0058
Amusement And Recreation Services 1.8 0.0183
Health Services 1.4256 0.0329
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related Services 2.2355 0.0119
Entire Sample, Employees 3.171 0.0065
Entire Sample, Executives (Directors, Board members and Officers) 3.6945 0.0052
Entire Sample, Cashless (same day Sale) Exercise (all employees) 3.166 0.0066
Entire Sample, only Exercise (all employees) 4.413 0.0041
Table 5: Calculating δ using the stock price to exercise price ratio at the exercise date
 
 
Estimating non diversification using the specific characteristics of each stock option 
(and the stock to exercise price ratio) 
The purpose of this subsection is to estimate the non diversification measure for each 
exercise record using the specific characteristics of each stock option, and then use the non 24 
diversification measure we estimated to calculate the stock option value to the employee at the 
grant date.  Hence, we first match for each exercise record the risk free rate and historical 
volatility at the exercise date, assuming that the private value of the employee equals to the 
stock  option  intrinsic  value  at  the  exercise  date,  and  use  this  data  to  estimate  the  non 
diversification measure.  At the second stage we match for each exercise record the risk free 
rate and historical volatility at the grant date and calibrate the non diversification measure from 
the first stage to value the stock option at the grant date. We describe the actions of this 
subsection in the following paragraphs: 
First, we checked the IPO dates of each of the sample firms (and in some cases the dates 
in which the firms were taken private), and exclude all the exercise records in which the grant 
date was earlier than the IPO date (or later than the date these firms were taken private).  
During this process, ten firms were excluded from the sample.   
The next step was to trace the stock prices for the firms in the sample.  During this 
process, seven firms were dropped due to lack of stock prices data or insufficient data.  The 
remaining stock prices of the sample firms were obtained using CRSP, Tel-Aviv stock exchange 
(TASE) website and Yahoo! Finance and Yahoo! Finance UK websites.  Some firms quote their 
historical  stock  prices  at  their  website,  so  historical  stock  data  was  obtained  from  these 
websites. 
Next, we focused on low trading volumes in the sample firms.  We required a minimum 
of 14 trading days in a month for volatility estimation, and as a result, one firm was excluded 
from the sample and for seven other firms the sample period was restricted (i.e., the exercise 
records from the low trading volume period were excluded).  
We used the historical stock prices and calculated the daily continuous compounded 
return and the historical volatility of the stocks. We started from a minimum estimation period 
of 20 trading days (from the firm's IPO, subject to the 14 trading days in a month restriction), 
expanding the estimation window to 30 days and then used a rolling window estimation of 30 
trading  days  to  estimate  historical  volatility.  Then,  we  match  between  the  daily  historical 
volatility of the stock at the exercise date to the employee exercise record, and multiple it by 
the square-root of the remaining option life (in days). 
The risk free rate data was adjusted according to the currency in which the firm's shares 
are traded.  Since the firms are traded in exchanges in different countries, we used several data 
sources:  The proxy for the US risk free data is the annual rate of the 3 months T-bill, which was 
obtained from Federal Reserve Statistical Release website.  The proxy for the Israeli risk free 
data is the daily MAKAM rates obtained for the Bank of Israel website.
27  The proxy for the UK 
risk free rate is the yield of the Sterling certificates of deposit for 3 months, obtained from the 
Bank of England website.  As a proxy for the risk free rate in the Germany we used the yield on 
                                                      
27 MAKAM is a zero coupon bond issued by the Bank of Israel, parallel to one year Treasury bill. 25 
debt securities outstanding issued by residents obtained from the Central bank of Germany 
(Deutsche Bundesbank) website.
28   
Additional estimation was the expiration date of each exercise record.  Since this data 
was insufficient for ESOs grants before 2000, we examined each deviation from 10 years' period 
between the grant date and the expiration date (which serves as the convention period in ESOs 
grants).  In this respect, we excluded exercise records of ex-employees in which the original 
expiration date was identical to the last date of exercise and the option life was considerable 
short (less than 3 years).  We also excluded exercise records in which the gap between the 
original expiration date and the grant date was less than 4 years.  We also excluded exercise 
records that lack a matching expiration date.  As for the dividend yield, since most of the 
sample firms didn't pay any dividends in the past (including the sample period), we assumed a 
dividend yield of zero for the entire sample.  The last action was to exclude all exercise records 
that  were  100  days  before  the  option  expiration  date.    Since  we  try  and  estimate  non-
marketability which results from early exercise, we exclude all exercises which are result from 
expiration.  In other words, employees which hold their stock options until expiration did not 
signal  on  their  value  by  early  exercising  and therefore  may  bias  the  estimation.    The final 
sample contains 33,294 exercise records from 65 companies. 
Table 6 summarizes the sample firm description for this stage. Still, most of the sample 
firms and the exercise records are classified as new-economy firms (69.23% from the firms and 
73.83% from the exercise records in the sample).  
Industry Two-
digit 
firm-
level SIC
Percentage 
(number of 
firms)
Percentage 
(number of 
employees)
Food And Kindred Products 20 1.54% 0.16%
Paper And Allied Products 26 1.54% 0.73%
Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 27 1.54% 0.17%
Chemicals And Allied Products 28 3.08% 0.39%
Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 35 16.92% 28.71%
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, 
Except Computer Equipment
36 26.15% 38.48%
Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, 
Medical And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks
38 7.69% 7.22%
Communications 48 7.69% 7.73%
Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 50 1.54% 0.20%
Depository Institutions 60 1.54% 2.09%
Business Services 73 26.15% 6.64%
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related 
Services
87 4.62% 7.48%
Table 6: Sample Firms Description
 
The following tables summarize the variables we use the estimate the value of the non 
marketability measure δ at the exercise date.  In table 7A we report the summary statistics of 
the remaining time to maturity (in years) at the exercise date (i.e. it’s the period between the 
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option exercise date to the option expiration date) and in table 7B we report on the time to 
maturity (in years) of the stock options.   
 
Industry Average SD Max Min 1st quartile 4th quartile
Full Sample 4.669 2.334 9.978 0.274 2.871 6.564
Food And Kindred Products 1.868 0.770 2.975 0.529 1.104 2.555
Paper And Allied Products 1.527 0.768 4.003 0.288 0.852 1.979
Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 7.068 0.735 8.553 5.441 6.679 7.512
Chemicals And Allied Products 6.949 1.467 9.373 0.630 6.370 7.904
Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 3.831 2.036 9.318 0.274 2.373 4.981
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, 
Except Computer Equipment
5.417 2.129 9.948 0.274 4.025 7.167
Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, 
Medical And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks
2.417 1.955 9.781 0.274 0.923 2.836
Communications 6.679 1.638 9.948 0.282 5.841 7.879
Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 8.493 1.093 9.663 5.975 8.600 8.992
Depository Institutions 3.101 1.317 6.197 0.395 1.962 4.196
Business Services 5.973 2.194 9.978 0.282 4.460 7.674
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related 
Services
3.506 1.439 9.266 0.282 2.577 4.490
Entire sample, employees 4.630 2.333 9.978 0.274 2.830 6.460
Entire sample, executives (Directors and Officers) 5.749 2.115 9.748 0.477 4.013 7.504
Entire sample, exercise (cash) 5.238 2.399 9.660 0.282 3.586 7.274
Entire sample, SDS (same day sale) 4.664 2.333 9.978 0.274 2.866 6.554
Table 7A: Time to maturity of the stock options (in years) at the exercise date
This table provides the summary statistics over the sample period for the remaining term (in years) of the stock option at the exercise date. 
The remaining term is measured as the difference between the expiration date and the exercise date.  The summary statistics is organized by 
the two-digit firm-level SIC categories ass reported by CRSP.  
 
Industry Average SD Max Min 1st quartile 4th quartile
Full Sample 8.087 1.918 16.008 4.003 6.005 10.005
Food And Kindred Products 6.283 0.931 8.005 4.268 5.851 6.923
Paper And Allied Products 5.225 0.839 9.005 4.003 5.003 5.003
Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 10.008 0.001 10.008 10.005 10.008 10.008
Chemicals And Allied Products 10.023 0.039 10.181 10.005 10.005 10.008
Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 7.162 1.571 10.507 4.123 6.003 8.003
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, 
Except Computer Equipment
9.091 1.511 16.008 4.003 7.164 10.008
Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, 
Medical And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks
5.785 1.628 10.008 4.003 5.000 5.003
Communications 9.751 0.572 10.008 5.849 10.005 10.005
Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 9.312 1.270 10.433 6.499 9.501 10.005
Depository Institutions 5.741 0.761 7.247 4.003 6.000 6.000
Business Services 9.032 1.844 10.008 4.003 9.871 10.008
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related 
Services
6.938 0.679 10.008 4.044 7.003 7.005
Entire sample, employees 8.066 1.921 16.008 4.003 6.005 10.005
Entire sample, executives (Directors and Officers) 8.684 1.728 10.079 4.003 7.005 10.008
Entire sample, exercise (cash) 8.941 1.809 16.008 4.003 7.045 10.008
Entire sample, SDS (same day sale) 8.080 1.917 16.008 4.003 6.005 10.005
Table 7B: Time to maturity (in years) of the option at the grant date
This table reports the time to maturity of the option grants at the grant date. The time to maturity is measured as the number of years 
between the grant date and the expiration date of the option grant. The summary statistics are computed over all the exercise records in 
the sample period. The summary statistics by the two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.  
Table  7B  presents  quite  homogeneous  picture:  The  average  contractual  option  life 
ranges  between  eight  to  ten  years,  with  some  options  grants  that  range  16  years.    The 
minimum period in the sample is four years.  Combined with the data of table 7A, the data 
indicates that on average the ESOs in the sample are exercised when there are nearly two-27 
thirds to half of the option term remaining.  These findings are consistent with the findings of 
Huddart and Lang (1996) and Carpenter et al. (2008). The sectors that deviate from this early 
exercise pattern are the food and kindred products and the paper and allied products (SIC 
codes 20 and 26, respectively). 
Table 8 uses the average stock price to exercise price ratio at the exercise date and 
calculates the implied delta using the specific annual risk free rate, historical volatility, time to 
expiration  and  dividend  yield  (all  at  the  exercise  date).
29  The  ratios  are  divided  to  groups 
according to the CRSP SIC codes, and in addition an average data is calculated to rank and file 
employees relative to executives and to exercise records that only exercised the stock option 
relative to exercise records in which the stock acquired was sold immediately.  
Industry Average SD Max Min 1st quartile 4th quartile
Full Sample 0.025 0.036 0.474 0.000 0.005 0.030
Food And Kindred Products 0.009 0.007 0.027 0.002 0.004 0.014
Paper And Allied Products 0.010 0.006 0.035 0.003 0.007 0.011
Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 0.008 0.004 0.019 0.004 0.005 0.009
Chemicals And Allied Products 0.021 0.031 0.285 0.001 0.007 0.025
Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 0.020 0.031 0.414 0.000 0.003 0.025
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, 
Except Computer Equipment
0.032 0.044 0.469 0.000 0.006 0.039
Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, 
Medical And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks
0.023 0.026 0.319 0.000 0.010 0.025
Communications 0.023 0.029 0.353 0.000 0.008 0.025
Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 0.030 0.028 0.160 0.004 0.016 0.028
Depository Institutions 0.026 0.027 0.299 0.007 0.015 0.026
Business Services 0.023 0.033 0.474 0.000 0.005 0.029
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related 
Services
0.018 0.021 0.291 0.000 0.008 0.021
Entire sample, employees 0.026 0.036 0.474 0.000 0.005 0.031
Entire sample, executives (Directors and Officers) 0.016 0.021 0.328 0.000 0.004 0.022
Entire sample, exercise (cash) 0.027 0.042 0.328 0.000 0.004 0.032
Entire sample, SDS (same day sale) 0.025 0.036 0.474 0.000 0.005 0.030
Table 8: The non-marketability estimation using the S/X ratio at the exercise date
This table reports the non-marketability estimation at the exercise date. We value the non-marketability using the spesific characthers of 
each exercise record. Time to maturity is measured as the number of years between the exercise date and the original expiration date of 
the option grant. Annual risk free rate is adjusted according to the share's currency. Volatility is estimated by historical volatility of the share. 
The summary statistics are computed over all the exercise records in the sample period and grouped using two-digit firm-level SIC categories 
as reported in CRSP.  
Table 8 presents a different picture comparing to table 5.  The mean non-diversification 
measure in the entire sample has more than fourfold, and a similar tendency is within the SIC 
sectors, except the food and kindred products and the paper and allied products (SIC codes 20 
and 26, respectively).  This change emphasizes the importance of using accurate measures in 
ESOs estimation.  It also points out that the value of ESOs according to the private pricing model 
is less than the one predicted from table 5 outcomes. 
Additional difference that rises from table 8 is the difference in the non diversification 
measure between rank and file employees comparing to executives.  According to the results, 
executives have a lower non-diversification measure.  It means that, ceteris paribus, executives 
tend to exercise their stock options later (or closer to expiration) than rank and file employees.  
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Table  9  presents  the  valuation  estimations  of  the  stock  options  at  the  grant  date, 
relative to the BS value at the grant date.  These estimations, using the private pricing model, 
calibrate the non diversification measure which was calculated at the exercise date (presented 
in table 8) and using annual risk free rate, historical volatility, time to expiration and dividend 
yield—all at the exercise date—we calculate the private value of the ESO.  We assume a vesting 
period of three years. 
Industry Average SD Max Min 1st quartile 4th quartile
Full Sample 48.23% 29.62% 99.97% 0.00% 22.01% 74.24%
Food And Kindred Products 69.06% 16.17% 89.36% 32.05% 57.79% 82.24%
Paper And Allied Products 68.32% 13.21% 88.35% 25.40% 62.34% 76.02%
Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 65.30% 9.82% 76.42% 37.53% 60.05% 73.31%
Chemicals And Allied Products 50.35% 24.21% 93.75% 0.00% 31.24% 70.02%
Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 57.97% 30.62% 99.97% 0.00% 29.92% 85.37%
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, 
Except Computer Equipment
41.21% 30.37% 99.80% 0.00% 13.27% 70.14%
Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, 
Medical And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks
47.15% 23.59% 98.87% 0.00% 32.45% 60.94%
Communications 43.73% 24.55% 99.17% 0.00% 28.47% 62.45%
Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 30.92% 18.55% 74.89% 0.00% 21.45% 39.14%
Depository Institutions 44.78% 17.30% 73.96% 0.00% 36.69% 56.42%
Business Services 48.47% 28.91% 99.46% 0.00% 26.03% 74.18%
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related 
Services
50.92% 24.96% 97.57% 0.00% 33.22% 68.91%
Entire sample, employees 47.98% 29.68% 99.97% 0.00% 21.68% 74.05%
Entire sample, executives (Directors and Officers) 55.07% 27.00% 97.57% 0.00% 32.96% 78.73%
Entire sample, exercise (cash) 51.28% 32.34% 99.77% 0.00% 22.11% 80.45%
Entire sample, SDS (same day sale) 48.20% 29.59% 99.97% 0.00% 22.00% 74.20%
Table 9: ESO private value relaitive to Black-Scholes value (in percentage) at the grant date
This table reports the value of the ESO using the private pricing model relative to a plain-vanilla Black-Scholes value of the stock option at 
the grant date. The non-marketability measure was estimatied at the exercise date and calibrated into the model. Time to maturity is 
measured as the number of years between the grant date and the original expiration date of the option grant. Annual risk free rate is 
adjusted according to the share's currency. Volatility is estimated by historical volatility of the stock. The summary statistics are computed 
over all the exercise records in the sample period, and grouped using two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.  
According to table 9 outcomes, the private value of the employee is about 50% on 
average relative to a plain vanilla BS option value with the same contractual life.  In the food 
and kindred products and the paper and allied products (SIC codes 20 and 26, respectively) 
industries  the  value  is  higher  is  around  65%.    In  addition,  it  seems  that  option  values  to 
executives are higher than option values to non-executive employees.  Overall, these results 
point out on a relative high discount of equity based compensation.
30  
Table 9 findings are consistent with the findings of Ikaheimo et al. (2006), which use ESO 
values of executives which can be traded in the Helsinki stock exchange after the ESO has been 
vested (which means these are transferable stock options).  By analyzing 27,808 trades they 
show major underpricing of the ESO which can reach over 50% discount relative to BS value.  
Note, however, that Ikaheimo et al. (2006) examine options which are known as tradable stock 
options  (since  the  options  can  be  traded  after  the  vesting  period)  and  hence  the  non 
marketability associated with these options should be less comparing to the standard case of 
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calculation of 130 trading days (as a proxy of expected volatility). The results are similar. 29 
untradeable stock options (which is also the case of the ESOs in Tamir Fishman sample).  It 
implies that the untradeable stock options the discount should be higher than the one found by 
Ikaheimo et al. (2006).   
Estimating non diversification using the ESO to RSU ratio 
The second measure of non diversification obtained from the substitution ratio between 
ESOs and RSUs.  The substitution between these two share based payments became common 
in  practice  with  the  introduction  of  FAS  123(R).    For  example,  on  December  2005,  Intel 
announced  that  its  employees  will  receive  much  more  of  their  equity  compensation  in 
restricted stock rather in stock options.  According to the announcement, the vesting period will 
remain the same (four-year period), but the RSUs will be about a third fewer than they would 
have received in stock options.
31  In the popular press reports, a substitution ratio between one 
third and half is common.
32  
Brown and Lee (2007) discuss the substitution between ESOs to restricted stocks in the 
compensation of the top five executives around the issuance of FAS 123R.  They find that firms 
were  more  likely  to  replace  ESOs  with  restricted  stocks  but  not  with  other  forms  of 
compensation post to FAS 123R.  They also find that on average a one dollar decrease in ESO 
(calculated  using  the  BS  pricing  model,  as  in  EXECUCOMP  database)  is  offset  by  35  cents 
increase in restricted stock in their sample firms. 
Figure 8 presents the value of non diversification measure δ as a function of the ESO to 
RSU  ratio  (in  which  the  non  diversification  measure  is  a  joint  pricing  factor).    The  results 
indicate that a substitution ratio of one third between ESOs to RSUs (as Intel declared) would 
result in a non diversification measure of 0.0135 for our input parameters. 
 
                                                      
31See http://news.cnet.com/2100-1006_3-5998834.html and http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-146082.html 
32See,  for  example,  http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/columnist/block/2003-07-14-ym_x.htm    and 
http://management.about.com/cs/money/a/ResStkFAQ1203.htm.  30 
The value of δ for a given ESO/RSU substitution ratio 
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Figure 8: Estimation of δ for a given substitution ratio of the ESO value to RSU value.  The inputs are: stock price = 
50; option exercise price = 50; vesting period = 3 years; annual risk free rate = 5%; volatility = 35%; annual dividend 
yield = 0%; exit rate = 3%; δ = 0.01; number of periods = 400 (with a number of 40 subdivisions in a year). 
   
7.  Accounting treatment of equity based compensation  
The measurement basis of equity based compensation in FAS 123(R)
33 
The numerical valuation of ESOs has become a heated issue, dealt with in FASB 123(R).  
In this paper we focus on the measurement basis of ESOs and RSUs in public firms according to 
the accounting standard.  We begin with a brief survey of FAS 123(R) and then turn to discuss 
the fair-value estimation set by the standard.  
Statement 123(R) establish the objective that the compensation cost associated from 
equity  based  compensation  should  ne  measured  based  on  the  value  of  employee  services 
received  in  exchange  for  the  equity  instrument.
34    However,  FASB  recognize  that  it  is  not 
feasible  to  measure  directly  those  employee  services,  and  as  a  result  concluded  that  the 
measurement should be based on the fair value of the equity instruments issued.  This decision, 
according  to  FASB,  is  consistent  with  the  measurement  basis  of  other  forms  of  employee 
                                                      
33 We concentrate in the U.S accounting standard.  Most western countries have similar rules: see, for example, 
the International Accounting Standard Board IASB, the Australian accounting standard AASB2 and the Canadian 
Accounting Standard Board CASB. 
34 FAS 123 (revised 2004), paragraph 9. 31 
compensation including cash and pension benefit.  However, the fair-value definition is subject 
to  exceptions,  among  them  are  service  conditions,  performance  conditions,  and  other 
restrictions that apply only during the requisite service period.
35  In other words, according to 
the statement no restrictions in the vesting period should account in the fair value estimation 
for  reporting  purposes.    It  implies  that  for  accounting  purposes,  RSU  value  equals  to 
unrestricted stocks and the non-diversification of ESOs during the vesting period is ignored.
 36 
For restrictions that continue to effect after the vesting period should be considered in 
the fair value estimation of the equity based instrument.  With respect to stock option, the FAS 
123(R) state that the effect of non-marketability should be taken into account by "reflecting the 
effects of employees’ expected exercise and post-vesting employment termination behavior in 
estimating fair value (referred to as an option’s expected term)".
37 
 
The measurement basis in FAS 123(R) – discussion 
It's not clear why statement 123(R) ignores non-marketability and mandate risk-neutral 
valuation during the vesting period, while mandating to take into account the non-marketability 
effect after vesting.  In addition, one should wonder why FASB, instead of incorporating non-
marketability to calculate the fair value estimation, choose to use expected life which is the 
result of non-marketability of the granted stock options.  
In this respect, Chance and Yang (2004) mention it is not at all clear that risk neutral 
valuation, incorporated in the public state prices{ } , u d q q , is appropriate for accommodating 
risks  such  as  forfeiture  and  early  exercise.  These  risks  are  not  irrelevant,  probably  not 
diversifiable, and almost surely do not have a zero market price of risk. 
In addition, Chance and Yang (2004) argue that FASB does not address what is arguably 
the most important issue in the valuation of ESOs: the liquidity discount that presumably exists 
because holders of these instruments cannot sell them.  They claim that recommending that 
the option would be valued with a maturity corresponding to the expected exercise date as a 
solution for non-marketability is an incorrect solution. For example, if a firm issues a European-
style call option that cannot be exercised until expiration to its executive, then (assuming away 
the possibility that the employee leaves the company or is fired), a lattice model would produce 
a value that corresponds, in the limit, to the Black-Scholes value.  Under the FASB proposal, a 
company  could  not  value  the  option  with  a  shorter  expiration,  because  the  option  is  not 
exercisable  until  expiration.    Yet,  such  an  option  should  be  less  valuable  than  a  standard 
European option, because the employee could not sell the option before expiration.  Thus, the 
FASB approach would overstate the ESO value rather than reflect a liquidity discount.  Since the 
FASB  procedure  does  not  value  the  liquidity  discount  at  all for  options  exercisable  only  at 
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37 FAS 123(R), paragraph 17.  32 
expiration, it clearly cannot be valuing the liquidity discount for options exercisable prior to 
expiration.  
It's also seems that there is confusion between reason and result. Quoting the IFRS2 
statement (paragraph B5): 
"The entity shall consider factors that knowledgeable, willing market participants would 
consider in selecting the option pricing model to apply. For example, many employee 
options have long lives, are usually exercisable during the period between vesting date 
and the end of the options’ life, and are often exercised early. These factors should be 
considered when estimating the grant date fair value of the options." 
The early exercise is not a factor of the fair value estimation.  The factor is the fact that 
the stock options are non-tradable before and after the vesting period.  The result of the non-
marketability is the early exercise of the stock option.  Therefore, we believe, the statement 
should  encourage  valuation  models  that  account  for  non-marketability  and  result  in  early 
exercise of the stock option due to that reason (among others).  
 
Employee stock options: Is its cost differs from its value?? 
In statement 123(R), the terms cost and value are usually being used interchangeably to 
refer to the fair value of equity based compensation, both by the statement and most of the 
studies on ESO valuation.  However, one of the major disputes regarding the recognition of 
ESOs as an expense in the financial reports was basically a cost-value issue.
38  Reviewing the 
literature, we can try and infer the author’s view regarding the relation between value and cost.  
We choose, however, to refer only to the literature that relates explicitly to this issue. 
We begin with the definitions of the value of an ESO and the cost of an ESO: The value 
of  an  ESO  to  the  employee  (executive)  is  her  certainty  equivalent  –  it’s  the  risk-less  cash 
compensation  amount  that  the  employee  is  willing  to  exchange  in  lieu  the  stock  option 
(hereinafter: value).  The cost of an ESO to the granting firm is the cash amount the firm could 
have received in case it sells this stock option to an outside investor rather then granting it to 
the employee (executive) (hereinafter: cost).
39 
  We start with the notion that the cost to the granting firm is bigger that the option value 
to the employee.  Hall and Murphy (2002) argue that traditional valuation formulas such as the 
Black-Scholes  option  pricing  formula  provide  an  adequate  estimation  to  the  firm’s  cost.
40  
However,  since  the  options  are  granted  to  an  undiversified  and  risk-averse  executive,  she 
places a lower value on the stock option.  The gap between the cost and the value reflects the 
                                                      
38 In the debate regarding the recognition of ESOs compensation in the accounting reports, the opponents claim 
that the widely used valuation models are not suitable to value ESOs which are not tradable.  The supporters of 
expensing ESOs claimed that since its part of compensation, it must be expensed. 
39 These definitions are presented, for example, by Carpenter (1998) and Hall and Murphy (2002). 
40 This cost estimation ignores complications that relates to ESOs, such as early exercise and potential forfeiture 
(Hall and Murphy (2002)). 33 
unattractiveness of the stock option to the executive.
41  According to Hall and Murphy (2002), 
the firm should expense its economic cost.  The notion that cost is bigger than value is also 
mentioned by Kadam et al. (2005), Ignersoll (2006), Cvitanić et al. (2007), Cai and Vijh (2004) 
and Carpenter (1998, 2010).   
  The other  view,  in  which  we  support,  claims  that  cost  equals  value.   This notion  is 
supported by Chance and Yang (2004), Lambert and Larcker (2004) and Rubinstein (1995).
42  
Chance and Yang (2004) identify an inconsistency in Hall and Murphy (2002) line of reasoning.  
They argue that Hall and Murphy (2002) ignore the incentives effect provided by the stock 
options, and values the options strictly as an alternative to cash compensation, without any 
other benefit that relates to the use of stock options.  Adopting Hall and Murphy (2002) line of 
reasoning,  Change  and  Yang  (2004)  propose  pareto-optimal  alternatives  to  stock  option 
compensation.  For example, the firm could sell the stock option to an outside investor and pay 
the proceeds to the executive.  In this case the firm’s cost shall be the same, but the executive 
(facing a lower value for stock options) will be better off.
43  However, the difference between all 
these  alternatives  to  ESOs  grants  is  that  the  executive  would  not  have  incentive  and  will 
probably liquidate.
44  
Chance and Yang (2004) also identify an inconsistency in the computational procedure. 
This procedure, under which the stock option value (calculated using risk-neutral probabilities 
and discounted using the risk free rate) is lower than the option’s cost.  Hence, it violates the 
law  of  one  price.    This  is  not  surprising,  since  as  mentioned  arbitrage  opportunities  exist.  
According to Chance and Yang (2004), this problem would not exist if value equals cost.  
Chance (2004) presents additional argument which respect to early exercise of ESOs.  
Hall and Murphy (2002) argue that early exercise reduces the cost to the firm, saving the time 
value of the stock option.  Thus, according to this argument companies would always want 
executive to exercise early, reducing cost to the firm.  However, companies impose vesting 
periods on options holders, and substitute vesting periods (which create incentive and retain 
employees) with costs.  Hence, these incentives should be reflected in the fair value estimation 
of the stock options. 
                                                      
41 The “unattractiveness” includes illiquidity, possible forfeit etc. 
42 See also Chance (2004).  
43 Additional examples of Chance and Yang (2004) to pareto-optimal alternatives are: buying a stock option in the 
open market and grant it to the executive; pay the executive its cost in cash instead using stock options; or pay the 
executive with N(d1) stocks and a loan with a variable face value of N(d2)X. 
44 The term “incentives” is used in the board sense, which in addition to creating incentives to increase firm value, 
include also retention, sorting and attraction of employees. In this sense, stock options provide incentives also to 
non-executive employees.  See, for example, Ittner et al. (2001), Core and Guay (2001), Oyer and Schaefer (2005) 
and Kedia and Mozumdar (2002).   
In addition, stock options are considered as a compensation form which creates more incentives compared to 
other equity compensations. For example, Oyer and Schaefer (2006) find that the choice of options over restricted 
stocks is consistent with firms using equity grants to attract and retain employees. 34 
Additional  support  for the  notion  that  value equals  cost  is  presented  by  Rubinstein 
(1995),  Lambert  and  Larcker  (2004)  and  Zion  and  Carcache  (2004)  from  Credit  Suisse  First 
Boston.  Rubinstein (1995) mentions that if the potential for early exercise exists, there should 
be no difference between the value of the option to its cost.  Lambert and Larcker (2004) 
mentions that prior work which suggested that the value of an ESO to a risk-averse employee is 
less than the cost to the firm ignores or fails to properly incorporate the incentive effect of 
option-based contracts.  Zion and Carcache (2004) mention that ESOs are a potential claim on 
the firm’s future cash flows, and the best estimation of the fair value of that claim is the 
amount that the firm would pay to its employees to settle the obligation. 
It is interesting to mention that most of the authors that support the view the cost is 
bigger than the value attribute this difference to incentive effects.  So, basically, the argument 
can be narrowed to reporting of incentives: should only the cost be reported, or the reduced 
cost (i.e., value), which takes into account the firm's benefit from incentive of equity based 
compensation?
45 
We support Chance (2004) and Rubinstein (1995) view that the value of stock option to 
the employee is equal to the cost to the granting firm, since the stock options represents the 
alternative wage replaced by the ESO and hence the economic cost of the option (Putting 
differently, we disagree with the cost definition of Hall and Murphy (2002) which ignores the 
incentives value).
46  A different interpretation implies sub-optimal compensation or sub-optimal 
cost (an mentioned by Chance and Yang (2004)):  If cost is bigger than value than the firm cost 
from option grants is bigger than the alternative cash compensation or that the employee stock 
option  compensation  is  lower  than  his  alternative  cash  compensation.    Thus,  the  rational 
costing of the ESO is to value the option through the eyes of the employee.   
From  the  accounting  treatment  perspective,  we  believe  that  since  the  cost  to  the 
granting firm equals to the value of the employee, the accounting expense on ESOs should 
reflect it.  First, recall that the objective of accounting standard is to recognize in the financial 
statements the employee services received in exchange for equity instruments issued.  This 
view is expressed literally in the accounting standard itself, which demands estimation of the 
fair value of the ESO, and includes incentive value.  Second, as mentioned by Chance (2004), 
conceptually  it  is  not  much  different  from  goodwill.    When  a  company  purchases  another 
company for more than book value, it records goodwill.  In issuing an option, the company 
receives a form of goodwill from the option holder: the incentives lead to loyalty and effort 
over a future period.   
 
                                                      
45 For example, Carpenter (1998) view and Rubinstein (1995) and Chance (2004) views are the opposite of each 
other, but they both share the same reasoning. 
46 Hall and Murphy (2002) claim that the cost of issuing a non-tradeable and non-hedgeable stock option to an 
employee is identical to the cost of issuing a tradable and hedgeable stock option to an outside investor. 35 
8.  Conclusion and summary 
  This  paper examines the  valuation of  employee  stock  options  and  restricted  stocks, 
which  are  common  practices  of  share-based  payments.    Our  base-case  model,  Benninga-
Helmantel-Sarig (2005), provides a simple framework for pricing these options using private 
state prices.     
The private pricing model has two computational advantages over existing approaches 
in  pricing  ESOs.    First,  compared  to  lattice  and  continuous-time  models  which  employ  an 
arbitrary algorithm to explain early exercise, the private pricing model provides an endogenous 
explanation of ESO early exercise.  Compared to the utility maximizing models which provide 
endogenous early exercise decision, the private pricing model can be viewed as a model that 
incorporates the utility model parameters into a single factor and thus provides a simplified and 
more flexible approach to describe exercise behavior and to compute the ESO value.  The 
second advantage of the BHS model in pricing ESOs is that we are able to quantify the non-
diversification effects.   
We show that the use of the BHS model is aligned with empirical findings in studies on 
ESOs  databases:    The  ratio  of  the  stock  price  to  exercise  price  and  the  value  forgone  (in 
percentage) comparing to Black-Scholes value (both at the exercise date) are within empirical 
estimations range.  The employee tends to exercise earlier as more restrictions are added to 
the stock options, if he is more undiversified and when the stock's volatility is higher.  We also 
show that the cost of ESOs is less than that postulated by other numerical models.  To show 
this,  we  incorporate  vesting,  exit  rate,  dividend  yield  into  our  private  pricing  model  and 
compare  it  to  other  ESOs  pricing  models  and  show  that  our  model  yields  lower  valuation 
results.  We also use the BHS model to value restricted stock units, using the private state prices 
in the vesting period only.  In accordance with Damodaran (2005a), we find that the value of 
restricted stocks depends on the length of the vesting period, the un-diversification measure of 
the employee and the stock volatility. 
  In the second part of the paper we use a proprietary data base (obtained from Tamir 
Fishman) which we use to estimate the un-diversification measure.  We use three measures in 
our estimation: the stock price to exercise price ratio at the exercise date, the Black-Scholes-
Merton forgone value at the exercise rate and finally the substitution ratio between employee 
stock options and restricted stock which was used by firms during the period that FAS 123(R) 
took effect. 36 
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